United Nations S/2017/119

Security Council

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Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1373 (2001), 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013) and 2322 (2016),

Reaffirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed, and *remaining determined* to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level,

Reaffirming that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group,

Stressing that the active participation and collaboration of all States and international, regional and subregional organizations is needed to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat, and *emphasizing* the importance of

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implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS), contained in General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006, and its subsequent reviews,

Reiterating the need to undertake measures to prevent and combat terrorism, in particular by denying terrorists access to the means to carry out their attacks, as outlined in Pillar II of the UN GCTS, including the need to strengthen efforts to improve security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, such as infrastructure and public places, as well as resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection, while recognizing that States may require assistance to this effect,

Recognizing that each State determines what constitutes its critical infrastructure, and how to effectively protect it from terrorist attacks,

Recognizing a growing importance of ensuring reliability and resilience of critical infrastructure and its protection from terrorist attacks for national security, public safety and the economy of the concerned States as well as wellbeing and welfare of their population,

Recognizing that preparedness for terrorist attacks includes prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery with an emphasis on promoting security and resilience of critical infrastructure, including through public-private partnership as appropriate,

Recognizing that protection efforts entail multiple streams of efforts, such as planning; public information and warning; operational coordination; intelligence and information sharing; interdiction and disruption; screening, search and detection; access control and identity verification; cybersecurity; physical protective measures; risk management for protection programmes and activities; and supply chain integrity and security,

Acknowledging a vital role that informed, alert communities play in promoting awareness and understanding of the terrorist threat environment and specifically in identifying and reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement authorities, and the importance of expanding public awareness, engagement, and public-private partnership as appropriate, especially regarding potential terrorist threats and vulnerabilities through regular national and local dialogue, training, and outreach,

Noting increasing cross-border critical infrastructure interdependencies between countries, such as those used for, inter alia, generation, transmission and distribution of energy, air, land and maritime transport, banking and financial services, water supply, food distribution and public health,

Recognizing that, as a result of increasing interdependency among critical infrastructure sectors, some critical infrastructure is potentially susceptible to a growing number and a wider variety of threats and vulnerabilities that raise new security concerns,

Expressing concern that terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and private sector alike and cause knock-on effects beyond the infrastructure sector,

Underlining that effective critical infrastructure protection requires sectoral and cross-sectoral approaches to risk management and includes, inter alia, identifying and preparing for terrorist threats to reduce vulnerability of critical infrastructure, preventing and disrupting terrorist plots against critical infrastructure where possible, minimizing impacts and recovery time in the event of damage from a terrorist attack, identifying the cause of damage or the source of an attack, preserving evidence of an attack and holding those responsible for the attack accountable,

Recognizing in this regard that the effectiveness of critical infrastructure protection is greatly enhanced when based on an approach that considers all threats and hazards, notably terrorist attacks, and when combined with regular and substantive consultation and cooperation with operators of critical infrastructure and law enforcement and security officials charged with protection of critical infrastructure, and, when appropriate, with other stakeholders, including private sector owners,

Recognizing that the protection of critical infrastructure requires cooperation domestically and across borders with governmental authorities, foreign partners and private sector owners and operators of such infrastructure, as well as sharing their knowledge and experience in developing policies, good practices, and lessons learned,

Recalling that the resolution 1373 (2001) called upon Member States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups and to cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks,

Noting the work of relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, entities, forums and meetings on enhancing protection, security, and resilience of critical infrastructure,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts between the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, and all other United Nations bodies, and *strongly encouraging* their further engagement with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system,

1. *Encourages* all States to make concerted and coordinated efforts, including through international cooperation, to raise awareness, to expand knowledge and understanding of the challenges posed by terrorist attacks, in order to improve preparedness for such attacks against critical infrastructure;

2. *Calls upon* Member States to consider developing or further improving their strategies for reducing risks to critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, which should include, inter alia, assessing and raising awareness of the relevant

risks, taking preparedness measures, including effective responses to such attacks, as well as promoting better interoperability in security and consequence management, and facilitating effective interaction of all stakeholders involved;

3. *Recalls* its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all States shall establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations, and *calls upon* all Member States to ensure that they have established criminal responsibility for terrorist attacks intended to destroy or disable critical infrastructure, as well as the planning of, training for, and financing of and logistical support for such attacks;

4. *Calls upon* Member States to explore ways to exchange relevant information and to cooperate actively in the prevention, protection, mitigation, preparedness, investigation, response to or recovery from terrorist attacks planned or committed against critical infrastructure;

5. *Further calls upon* States to establish or strengthen national, regional and international partnerships with stakeholders, both public and private, as appropriate, to share information and experience in order to prevent, protect, mitigate, investigate, respond to and recover from damage from terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure facilities, including through joint training, and use or establishment of relevant communication or emergency warning networks;

6. *Urges* all States to ensure that all their relevant domestic departments, agencies and other entities work closely and effectively together on matters of protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks;

7. *Encourages* the United Nations as well as those Member States and relevant regional and international organizations that have developed respective strategies to deal with protection of critical infrastructure to work with all States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and entities to identify and share good practices and measures to manage the risk of terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure;

8. *Affirms* that regional and bilateral economic cooperation and development initiatives play a vital role in achieving stability and prosperity, and in this regard *calls upon* all States to enhance their cooperation to protect critical infrastructure, including regional connectivity projects and related cross-border infrastructure, from terrorist attacks, as appropriate, through bilateral and multilateral means in information sharing, risk assessment and joint law enforcement;

9. *Urges* States able to do so to assist in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity development, training and other necessary resources, technical assistance, technology transfers and programmes, where it is needed to enable all States to achieve the goal of protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks;

10. *Directs* the CTC, with the support of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to continue as appropriate, within their respective mandates, to examine Member States efforts to protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks as relevant to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) with the aim of identifying good practices, gaps and vulnerabilities in this field;

11. *Encourages* in this regard the CTC, with the support of CTED, as well as the CTITF to continue working together to facilitate technical assistance and capacity building and to raise awareness in the field of protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, in particular by strengthening its dialogue with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and working closely, including by sharing information, with relevant bilateral and multilateral technical assistance providers;

12. *Encourages* the CTITF Working Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure including Vulnerable Targets, Internet and Tourism Security to continue its facilitation, and in cooperation with other specialized United Nations agencies, assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures upon request by Member States;

13. *Requests* the CTC to update the Council in twelve months on the implementation of this resolution;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 26 January 2017 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, transmitting the report on the international security presence in Kosovo, covering the period from 1 October to 31 December 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

In accordance with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I hereby attach a quarterly report on Kosovo Force operations covering the period from 1 October to 31 December 2016 (see enclosure). I would appreciate your making the report available to the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jens **Stoltenberg**

Enclosure

Report to the United Nations on Kosovo Force operations

1. The present report on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is submitted in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and covers the period from 1 October to 31 December 2016.

2. As at 31 December 2016, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre was 4,150. During the reporting period, there were no major security incidents, and there was no requirement for direct intervention by KFOR.

Security situation and operations

3. During the reporting period, there were no major changes to the overall security situation in Kosovo, which remained stable on the whole. In general, the trend is gradually growing more positive, as Serbia and Kosovo remain committed to the dialogue process under the auspices of the European Union.

4. KFOR continued to work in close cooperation and coordination with the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). One example is the recent Silver Sabre 2016 exercise, which was jointly executed with other security providers in Kosovo, namely, the Kosovo Police, EULEX and the Kosovo Security Forces, in Pristina and its vicinity in November.

5. As part of its efforts to maintain an effective force posture in all sensitive areas and to respond immediately if required, KFOR continued to conduct training and performed operational rehearsal activities in November and December to verify the readiness of the operational reserve forces.

6. During the first week of December, KFOR removed defences established in 2004 at the entrance of the Devic Monastery in the Skenderaj municipality, following an official request by the nuns living in the monastery. This event is a clear signal of the improving security situation and the ongoing normalization of relations between the Serb Orthodox Church and the institutions in Kosovo.

Summary

7. During the reporting period, KFOR continued to contribute to maintaining both a safe and secure environment and ensuring freedom of movement as part of a comprehensive international effort. The close coordination on the ground between KFOR, in its capacity as third responder, EULEX and the Kosovo Police continues to be highly effective.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit the address by the President of the Republic of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, given on 8 February 2017, on the occasion of the traditional ceremony to exchange New Year's wishes with the members of the diplomatic and consular corps and the representatives of international organizations accredited to Burundi (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Albert **Shingiro**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Speech of the President of the Republic of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, given on 8 February 2017, on the occasion of the traditional ceremony to exchange New Year's wishes with the members of the diplomatic and consular corps and the representatives of international organizations accredited to Burundi

1. At this solemn moment, when we come together for the traditional ceremony to exchange New Year's wishes, let us first give thanks to God Almighty for his clemency and blessings in the year 2016. We shall also implore Him to remain with us throughout this year.

2. I extend to you a cordial welcome to this beautiful city of Ngozi and I thank you for attending, in great number, this traditional function that allows us to mutually exchange wishes. May the year that began a month and a week ago be, for all of us, a time of peace, good health, prosperity and joy.

3. I thank you from the bottom of my heart, Your Excellencies, members of the diplomatic and consular corps and representatives of international organizations accredited to Burundi, for the best wishes you have extended to the people of Burundi, to me and to my family, through the touching words of His Excellency, Oupa Monareng, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of South Africa and Vice-Dean of the diplomatic and consular corps accredited to Burundi.

4. On behalf of the people and the Government of Burundi, in my name and in the name of my family, I would like to reciprocate the wishes you have extended to us.

5. May 2017 be a good and happy year for the countries and organizations you represent, for yourselves, for your families and for all those who are dear to you; a year of peace, security, national concord and resolution of all the conflicting situations that the contemporary world is experiencing today.

6. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the year 2016 was characterized by many security and humanitarian crises around the world, and Burundi was not spared. Indeed, there were political crises in Africa, the intensification of wars in the Near and Middle East, famines and floods, droughts and bushfires, earthquakes and the flow of migrants towards the West at an exponential pace, to name but a few.

7. Beyond statements of good intentions and the contents of international conventions on climate change, we believe that further efforts should be made in favour of the peoples of the less industrialized countries, who are the constant victims of the climate change and global warming that continue to destroy the ecosystem and biodiversity, causing material and human damage, often to the detriment of innocent populations.

8. In spite of the shock waves felt here and there, the different peoples of the world in general, and the people of Burundi in particular, have not sunk into despair or discouragement, confirming once again the innate capacities of man for endurance and in his search for survival.

9. As far as Burundi is concerned, you have had time to closely follow developments in our country. You may have noticed that the beginning and the end of 2016 were quite different in terms of security. As peace and security are a constant concern, here as elsewhere, we will spare no effort to do better than we did in 2016.

10. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I wish the year 2017 to be a year of return to the homeland for our compatriots who have fled Burundi. In actual fact, peace and security are a reality in Burundi, and the Government and people of Burundi are ready to welcome them and to move along with them in preparation for the 2020 elections, because this is the right time.

11. I thank Burundians who plucked up their courage to return home despite the persistent, overwhelming and discouraging rumours.

12. In order to make the people more participatory in matters pertaining to the life of the nation, the Government has established a National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue. This Commission is an open platform for all Burundians to make their views known over a series of questions concerning the life of the country.

13. Based on views expressed by the population of different social strata, a commission tasked with studying and suggesting amendments to some articles of the Constitution will soon be established, in order to update them and harmonize them with the laws and conventions ratified by Burundi, especially those governing regional integration within the East African Community.

14. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to briefly clarify the major features of my New Year's address to the nation. In the area of cooperation between Burundi and the international community, I reaffirm that Burundi has continued its search to expand the circle of friends, according to present-day and future interests of the country and its citizens.

15. Our diplomatic relations continue normally. Despite some sporadic incidents, there are no clouds in the relations of friendship and cooperation between Burundi and its traditional partners, to which new ones have been added with whom we share the same principle of mutual respect.

16. However, we cannot but acknowledge that misunderstandings and apprehensions with and from a few partners have arisen in the wake of the 2015 general elections, with repercussions that unfortunately continue at the present time, culminating in a deterioration of our bilateral relations with some countries and organizations.

17. There are also organizations, the media and so-called experts that have spared no effort to tarnish the image of Burundi through defamatory and slanderous reports and grotesque arrangements that are all converging towards a manoeuvre of changing the regime by undemocratic methods.

18. I call upon these countries, organizations and the media to regain their consciousness and to respect the international provisions on international relations and the sovereignty of States.

19. In the year 2017, my ultimate wish is that the classic approach of dialogue and consultation with Burundi's partners bear a special stamp, which is to permanently remove these misunderstandings and apprehensions and return to the principles of understanding and mutual respect.

20. Burundi will always remain attentive and constantly available to the international community, of which it is a full member. It is with this in mind that our troops on peacekeeping missions will continue their efforts alongside other countries, in spite of some form of ingratitude shown by some partners. Since the terrorist threat is global, we believe that the effective response should therefore be global, too, and that each of our countries has a role to play.

21. Several tragedies around the world have reminded us that terrorism is now multifaceted and has no borders. We must dare to say it, to name the evils, without exaggeration or omissions. Terrorism has killed peaceful citizens; lives have been swept away in Burundi, in the name of pseudopolitical demands.

22. In 2016, innocent families became bereaved by people who made terrorism their strategy, people who decided that some Burundians should perish in order to put pressure on the Government of Burundi and thus complete the failed 2015 coup. Today, the sponsors of these terrorist acts, reinforced by the kindness, if not the complicity, of some countries, are taunting the judicial institutions of the country, which are prevented from doing their jobs properly in the name of protecting human rights.

23. Let this year become a new beginning in the fight against terrorism, a fresh start in our choices, which must be more responsible. We find the declamation of anti-terrorist and pro-democratic literature to be absurd, hypocritical, paradoxical and utopian at a time when, behind the scenes, multiform supports are constantly granted to the troublemakers who stir things up and sow discord in the world to the detriment of responsible governments that are fighting tooth and nail against terrorism and to assert the rule of law. Promoting impunity will never erode terrorism.

24. The ethics of reciprocity, or the golden rule, refers to a moral rule whose fundamental principle is stated in virtually all the major religions and cultures of the world as follows: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you" or "Do not do to others what you would not want to be done to you".

25. Always bear in mind that God is fair at all times and in all places. The scriptures are clear indeed upon this matter: "For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again".

26. I encourage the members of the diplomatic missions to Burundi and the representatives of international organizations working in our country to continue to comply with the international instruments governing international relations.

27. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, my belief is that each political authority should not be limited to guaranteeing the safety of its citizens. We should become true promoters and peacemakers in thoughts, words and actions. Peace should never

be taken for granted; it always has to be built. It must be a constant concern and must assume an inclusive character.

28. This is therefore my wish for the year, which is already in its sixth week. Let there be many new opportunities to work together and to build genuine peace between our countries and their peoples. For its part, the Republic of Burundi, through the Ministry of Foreign Relations and International Cooperation, will always be available to collaborate with all those who commit themselves to ending the ongoing conflicts and to bringing support and hope to the suffering populations.

29. Before concluding my remarks, on behalf of the Government and the people of Burundi, I would like to reiterate my thanks to all of you gathered here today, to your countries and organizations, for the way in which you regularly contribute to supporting the independence and sovereignty of our country on the one hand and the development of our dear country on the other. I urge you to continue this praiseworthy action.

30. "Peace be with you!" This is how the Burundians begin and end their speeches. With this expression, a pledge of abundant blessings of every kind, I renew to each of you, distinguished members of the diplomatic corps, to your families and to the countries and organizations that you have the honour and the privilege of representing here in Burundi, my greetings and my most sincere wishes for the year 2017.

31. Long live the cooperation between the peoples of the world! Thank you for your kind attention.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 8 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chair of the Ambassadorial Group of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in New York to convey the Group's alarm about the latest Israeli violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Despite the very clear demands by the Security Council, most recently in its resolution 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016, for a halt to all Israeli settlement activities, the occupying Power persists with such illegal and destructive measures.

In addition to announcing plans for the construction of thousands more units in illegal Israeli settlements across the occupied West Bank, including in and around East Jerusalem, the occupying Power has just passed a so-called "regularization bill", which is another attempt to entrench its illegal settlements and so-called "settlement outposts" and to further facilitate the expropriation of Palestinian land with total impunity. The bill attempts to entrench another 4,000 Israeli settlement units in Occupied Palestine in addition to the thousands of settlement units illegally constructed and to which more than 600,000 Israeli settlers have been illegally transferred by the occupying Power.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation emphasizes that the aforementioned bill represents a flagrant breach of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly as well as blatant disregard for the will of the international community. Most recently, the Security Council, in resolution 2334 (2016), clearly condemned such unlawful Israeli colonization policies and called for their immediate cessation and for Israel's compliance with its legal obligations. This latest illegal measure, however, demonstrates Israel's total contempt for the law, for the will of the international community and for the fundamental pillars of peace in accordance with the two-State solution based on the pre-1967 borders. Rather than committing itself to peace on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions,

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the Madrid principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map, in line with the long-standing international consensus, Israel chooses over and over again to pursue illegal and unilateral policies that aim to cement its colonial occupation and are destroying the physical viability of the two-State solution and the chances of a just and lasting peace being achieved.

These most recent Israeli actions flouting the law compel us to call once again for all efforts to be exerted, in accordance with international law and the relevant United Nations resolutions, to bring a halt to Israel's systematic violations and denial of the rights of the Palestinian people and to advance the long overdue realization of their rights, including to self-determination and freedom in their independent State, and the achievement of a just and lasting solution to this conflict. It is high time to stop treating Israel as a State above the law and to hold it accountable for its violations and grave breaches of international law. Effective steps need to be taken by the international community to enforce the Security Council's resolutions. This is imperative for bringing an end to Israel's constant violations of international law and preserving the chances of realizing the two-State solution on the basis of the 1967 lines.

On behalf of OIC, and in view of the above-mentioned serious Israeli breach of international law, I sincerely appeal to you to do whatever is possible, in your capacity, to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016). Israel must be compelled to stop its violations and reverse all of its recent illegal measures, which pose serious risks to the already fragile situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the prospects for achieving peace.

Your good offices and your positive and proactive engagement with regard to this serious matter would thus be greatly appreciated.

I should also be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Muzaffar **Madrakhimov**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Chair of the Ambassadorial Group of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation in New York

United Nations S/2017/123

Security Council

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10 February 2017

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Identical letters dated 10 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to express the strong condemnation of Israel of the ballistic missile test conducted by Iran on 29 January 2017.

Iran fired the Khorramshahr medium-range missile, which travelled a distance of 1,000 kilometres. This is a Missile Technology Control Regime category one ballistic missile, capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kilograms for a range of over 300 kilometres. The test was confirmed by Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, who had stated, in September 2016, that Iran would start production of this missile.

The range of this missile covers all of Israel and is able to reach other States in the region. This poses a grave danger to the national security of Israel and to the region at large. In a direct threat towards Israel, a senior member of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Mojtaba Zonour, said recently, on 4 February, that only seven minutes were needed for the Iranian missile to hit Tel Aviv.

The test firing of this ballistic missile constitutes yet another flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. The resolution intended to restrict Iran from launching missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons — the very same missile that Iran test-fired on 29 January. The development of surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warhead capability reveals the true intentions of Iran not to comply with resolution 2231 (2015).

The Khorramshahr missile originates, even according to open sources, from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In the last year, DPRK has conducted several tests of the same kind of missile. This serves as additional proof of the cooperation between Iran and DPRK on the development and transfer of surface-to-surface missile technologies and of the violation by Iran of Security Council resolutions relating to DPRK.

Iran does not only pose a danger to Israel from afar, but it also uses proxies to threaten Israel directly within and along our borders. On 24 June 2016, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated in a televised address that Hezbollah receives all its weapons and missiles from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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This constitutes a further example of blatant disregard by Iran of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 1701 (2006).

The previous Secretary-General, in his report of 30 December 2016 on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), noted that any Iranian arms transfer to Hezbollah would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) should they have taken place after 16 January 2016 (see S/2016/1136, para. 8).

Iran continues to ignore its obligations to the international community and to develop its aggressive capabilities which pose a threat to Israel and to the whole region.

The ballistic missile programme of Iran must be stopped. I call upon the Security Council to respond firmly and decisively to these Iranian violations and provocations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/124

Security Council

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13 February 2017

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Letter dated 8 February 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you with reference to the letter dated 2 February 2017 from the Syrian regime's representative (S/2017/98).

Turkey categorically refutes the spurious allegations contained in the aforementioned letter and others to the same effect, as well as the statements made by the regime's representatives on various occasions. These are well-known efforts aimed at distorting the reality and undermining the documented facts regarding the atrocities committed by the regime that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In a letter dated 24 August 2016 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/739), we informed the members of the Council of the spillover effects of the Syria-based terrorism on Turkey and the measures that we had taken in response to the terrorist attacks carried out by Deash that had claimed the lives of hundreds.

The military operation that we initiated on 24 August 2016 against Deash, which has been directly and deliberately targeting Turkey, is essential in terms of ensuring our border and national security. It is also in line with the right to self-defence, as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the responsibility attributed to Member States in the fight against terrorism through the relevant Security Council resolutions.

As long as threats to our national security continue, we will not hesitate to exercise our rights emanating from international law, in full compliance with the established rules and regulations.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Güven **Begeç**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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United Nations S/2017/125

Security Council

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10 February 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 8 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you with regard to the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration, dated 3 January 2017 (S/2017/10).

I have the honour to inform you that Norway requests that the following item, listed in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned document, remain on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized:

67. Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Geir O. **Pedersen**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2017/126

Security Council

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10 February 2017

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Letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2325 (2016), I have the honour to transmit herewith the sixteenth programme of work of the Committee for the period from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2018 (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Sacha Sergio **Llorentty Solíz**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

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Annex

Programme of work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for the period from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2018

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 2325 (2016), decided that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) would submit its programme of work to the Council before the end of January of each year. The sixteenth programme of work of the Committee covers the period from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2018. The Committee has agreed on this programme of work to fulfil its responsibilities under Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016).

2. The Security Council, in paragraph 12 of its resolution 2325 (2016), decided that the Committee should continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through its programme of work. This includes the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in addition to States' efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Council also noted the need for more attention to be focused on enforcement measures; measures relating to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; proliferation finance measures; accounting for and securing related materials; and national export and trans-shipment controls.

3. The Committee will continue to work with Member States on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016), guided in its approach by the principles of transparency, equal treatment, cooperation and consistency.

4. To implement the sixteenth programme of work more efficiently, the Committee will continue to operate a system of four working groups, open to all of its members. Each working group is engaged in specific tasks relating to the programme of work, which are noted within each of the main sections below. Each working group will be chaired by a member of the Committee and support will be provided by the Secretariat and the Committee's group of experts. In addition, in striving to meet its objectives efficiently and promptly, the Committee will publish a schedule for periodic meetings of all four working groups which will include their periodic feedback.

5. All working group meetings will be announced and open to all Security Council delegations. All meeting documents will be circulated to all Council delegations before the meetings. The work will be organized in such a manner as to enable all delegations, regardless of size, to participate fully in all of the activities of the working groups. The Committee will promote greater transparency by, where relevant, holding open meetings on those working group outcomes approved by the Committee and by communicating those outcomes to national contact points. The Committee, in cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department

of Political Affairs and the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat, will also update its website regularly on the work of those groups.

6. The final document on the 2016 comprehensive review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (S/2016/1127) was submitted to the Council on 9 December 2016. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Council endorsed the comprehensive review and noted the findings and recommendations in its final report. The Committee will note in its work the findings and recommendations set out in the comprehensive review.

II. Tasks of the Committee and its four working groups

7. The Committee's focus of attention will be on, but not limited to, the following main areas of work: (a) monitoring and national implementation; (b) assistance; (c) cooperation with international organizations and other relevant United Nations bodies, including the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and (d) transparency and media outreach. In addition, the Committee will consider issues relating to administration and resources; and ensure that its work is conducted throughout the year in an appropriate and timely manner and that there is due consideration of and action in the areas agreed below.

A. Monitoring and national implementation

8. The Committee will:

(a) Brief the Security Council on its work by the end of March 2017 and submit the annual review on the implementation of Council resolution 1540 (2004) by the end of December 2017, while also continuing to brief the Council jointly with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism once within the present year;

(b) With the objective of achieving universal reporting as soon as possible, continue to strengthen efforts to encourage the remaining 16 Member States that have not yet submitted their first report to do so, including by engaging in dialogue with those States to highlight the importance of universal reporting and the assistance that is available and by assessing which practices have been most effective in stimulating national reporting; and continue to encourage Member States to submit additional information regarding implementation, while seeking, as appropriate, submissions that identify changes in existing information in a precise form and with supporting background information;

(c) Encourage the expansion and undertake initiatives to strengthen the capacity of national points of contact to assist in implementation of the resolution upon the request of States, including through the continuation on a regional basis of

the Committee's points of contact training programme; focuses of attention in this training programme should include the reporting and information-sharing capacities of States and continued adaptation of the course syllabus for each region;

(d) Following the completed revision of all matrices in 2016, continue ongoing updates and systematic review of all matrix information and formally consider how the format of those files and the process for updating them can be improved;

(e) Hold discussions on optimal approaches to enforcing appropriate effective laws for the prohibition of activities under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(f) Develop an approach to implementation and reporting that takes into account the specificity of States, inter alia, with respect to their ability to manufacture and export related materials, with a view to prioritizing efforts and resources where they are most needed without affecting the need for comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(g) Take note of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2325 (2016) with regard to effective national control lists;

(h) Continue to encourage States, in line with paragraphs 7 and 12 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) and paragraph 4 of Council resolution 2325 (2016), to identify and voluntarily report on effective national practices in implementing Council resolution 1540 (2004), and also continue the practice of sharing compilations of effective best practice periodically;

(i) Encourage States, under paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) and paragraph 5 of Council resolution 2325 (2016), to prepare, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans, as appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of Council resolution 1540 (2004), and to submit those plans to the Committee;

(j) Continue to raise awareness of those multilateral treaties and conventions that aim at preventing the proliferation of, or eliminating, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and, within the context of paragraph 8 (a) of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), to promote their universal adoption and full implementation and, where applicable, to promote their implementation by States parties to them;

(k) Also continue to raise awareness of the relevant international legal instruments whose implementation would address obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and, within the context of paragraph 8 (a) of Council resolution 1540 (2004), to promote their universal adoption and full implementation;

(l) Take note in its work, where relevant, of the continually evolving nature of the risks of proliferation within the context of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(m) Hold a closed expert-level meeting of the Committee to consider other issues highlighted in Security Council 2325 (2016), namely, the challenge of controlling access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that

could be used for proliferation, and accounting for and securing sensitive materials, with invitations to expert speakers, as appropriate.

B. Assistance

9. The Committee will:

(a) Maintain an up-to-date list of requests for assistance by States and offers of assistance by States and international, regional and subregional organizations; create a public list of possible forms of assistance, including actual examples to illustrate methods of assistance; and maintain a regularly updated database of requests for and offers of assistance, indicating where they have been matched;

(b) Review requests, offers and related assistance programmes as regards developing more effective matching strategies, and, in particular, seek ways to improve the flow of information among all parties involved;

(c) Revise its assistance template by March 2017, including the seeking of input from Member States and relevant international assistance providers, in order to support States in developing more detailed and effective assistance requests;

(d) Consider ways to better provide assistance, especially as a real-time response to requests made during dialogue with States, such as through securing and using additional resources, including, potentially, the use of the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities;

(e) Continue to organize and participate in outreach activities of the Committee, as will its group of experts, at the international, regional and subregional levels, while being prepared to emphasize and engage with regard to assistance programmes, and to promote the sharing of experience through peer reviews and other means, table-top exercises for evaluating and reinforcing effective practices, and lessons learned, while being ready to facilitate offers of or requests for assistance;

(f) Work with Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to help them develop assistance projects designed to support States in implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and make more effective offers of or, for States (or groups of States), more effective requests for assistance, including in relation to how the requests fit into their implementation plans, and when possible, assist States, upon their request, in the formulation of assistance requests;

(g) Engage actively in matching offers and requests for assistance and continue, where appropriate, to develop regional approaches to assistance needs and efforts to meet them, including through the holding of regional assistance conferences;

(h) Provide an update on the status of assistance requests and offers to the Committee on a regular basis, and no less frequently than every quarter.

C. Cooperation with international organizations and other relevant United Nations bodies

10. The Committee will:

(a) Continue to enhance its cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations and other relevant United Nations bodies, and develop ways of operating with those organizations on a case-by-case basis, and, where appropriate, reflecting programmatically the variation in each organization's capacity and mandate, including through exchanges at the working level, briefings to and from the Committee and enhanced information-sharing arrangements on issues such as networks of points of contact, effective practices and assistance;

(b) Under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), continue to encourage international, regional and subregional organizations to designate and provide a point of contact or coordinator for the implementation of Council resolution 1540 (2004) and maintain up-to-date information on such contacts;

(c) Maintain dialogue and information exchange with designated points of contact or coordinators on issues relating to their contribution to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(d) Convene a meeting with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations on the margins of the General Assembly for sharing information and experiences related to their efforts to facilitate implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(e) Where directly relevant to the goals of the Committee's programme of work, continue to participate in major events organized by international, regional and subregional organizations as offering an opportunity for dialogue with them and their points of contact or coordinators;

(f) Continue to explore opportunities to enhance ongoing cooperation with the related sanctions committees identified in paragraph 8 (a) above concerning counter-terrorism, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing and coordination on visits to States, within their respective mandates, and technical assistance, and other issues of relevance to all three committees;

(g) As appropriate, expand both formal and informal working relationships with international non-proliferation mechanisms, including zones free of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, and work streams to implement decisions of the Nuclear Security Summits, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, which was held in 2016, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Implementation Support Unit under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the non-proliferation facet of the Global Health Security Agenda and other United Nations bodies and international, regional and subregional organizations, where applicable:

(i) To facilitate the sharing of information on effective practices and lessons learned, in addition to templates and guidance, including with a view to their incorporation into the compilation envisaged in paragraph 9 (e) above;

(ii) To identify assistance requirements and programmes through which its work with international, regional and subregional organizations and other relevant United Nations bodies can focus on facilitating the activity of those organizations with respect to remedying national implementation challenges, such as reconciling priorities, harmonizing approaches, facilitating advisory and drafting services and matching requests for and offers of assistance, and to promote regional cooperation and communication on the implementation of the resolution;

(iii) To enhance information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries, within their respective mandates, technical assistance and other issues of relevance to the Committee and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, as appropriate.

D. Transparency and media outreach

11. The Committee will:

(a) Increase interaction on a regular basis with all States Members of the United Nations, including, where appropriate, through open meetings, as noted in paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) and paragraph 28 of Council resolution 2325 (2016), and by regularly updating its website;

(b) With input from the working group on monitoring and national implementation, post updated matrices approved by the Committee on the website, as appropriate, after allowing States to comment;

(c) Maintain the website as the main source of information and resources relating to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), while modernizing it in order to facilitate its use, inter alia, by Member States, Committee members, civil society and industry, and regularly updating it with information that includes, but is not limited to:

(i) A calendar of outreach events and workshops already conducted and confirmed upcoming events, including information notes on such activities;

(ii) A similar list of relevant activities, where available, of States, international, regional and subregional organizations, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and other United Nations bodies;

(iii) A list of frequently asked questions;

(d) Encourage States to promote dialogue and cooperation, including, where appropriate, with civil society and academia, to address the threat posed by illicit

trafficking in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials;

(e) Also encourage States to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry regarding its obligations under national laws, in line with paragraph 8 (d) of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), including to support the conduct of regional meetings with industry;

(f) Consider and seize opportunities, as appropriate, for direct interaction, with the consent of the States concerned, with relevant industries and industry groups, academia and civil society;

(g) Continue to increase efforts to raise awareness among parliamentarians and other high-level decision makers, for example, by participating in and supporting activities directly related to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by the Inter-Parliamentary Union;

(h) In line with paragraphs 5 (b) and 22 (d) of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), consider ways to better utilize and maintain expertise, including, in particular, that of former members of the group of experts, which could be made available for specific missions and assistance needs regarding the implementation of Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(i) Continue to brief Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, formally and informally, on the work of the Committee and the obligations and requirements under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

III. Administration and resources

12. The Committee will also consider issues relating to administration and resources. It will, inter alia:

(a) Undertake additional consideration of the efficiency and effectiveness of the special political mission that supports the Committee and report to the Security Council on the findings arising from its evaluation, within 2017, as appropriate;

(b) Continue its good cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to strengthen the regional capacity of the Office to provide support for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(c) Also continue to conduct regular meetings of the Committee and its working groups, and, as necessary, additional meetings with relevant parties so as to further the mandate under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), including meetings that may require participation from capitals on topics of high priority;

(d) Encourage States and international, regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, to support the work of the Committee and its programmes;

(e) Continue to encourage and take full advantage of voluntary financial contributions provided to assist States in identifying and addressing their needs with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and, at the

Committee's discretion, promote the efficient and effective use of the existing funding mechanisms within the United Nations system;

(f) Also continue to make efficient use of the expertise of its group of experts and consider ways of strengthening capabilities and effectiveness with regard to support for the Committee's work;

(g) Further continue its efforts to ease the transition of new non-permanent members into the Committee, including by making relevant documentation available and providing appropriate briefings, and maintain the network of non-permanent members leaving the Committee, to provide support for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(h) Regarding all aspects of the Committee's work, consider what methodologies may be appropriate for producing quantitative measures of success within the terms of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), including by examining options for technical support so as to enable better acquisition, storage, retrieval, analysis and display of data and facilitate reporting through electronic tools.

United Nations S/2017/127

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 February 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 7-10 February 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

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Annex to the letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Humanitarian bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (7 February 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out five humanitarian operations in Aleppo city (in the Bani Zayd district, at a mosque in the Zahrat Awwad district and at schools in the Old Aleppo, Salah-al-Din and South New Aleppo districts), during which 3.3 tons of bread were delivered to civilians.

Over the past 24 hours, humanitarian assistance has been provided to 2,500 residents.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by other States and international organizations

Over the past 24 hours, no humanitarian operations have been carried out in the Syrian Arab Republic by other foreign States or international organizations.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (8 February 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, three ceasefire agreements have been signed with Qaysa, Qasimiyah and Watiyah in Damascus governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,206.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 is unchanged — it is still 109.

Over the past 24 hours, 48 square kilometres have fallen under the control of government forces. A total area of 1,295.1 square kilometres has been liberated since 1 January 2017.

The number of populated areas which Syrian government forces have liberated from armed groups of the international terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 1 January 2017 has increased to 37.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported four violations: three in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Damascus governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 11 violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: 5 in Damascus, 4 in Idlib and 2 in Homs.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office was unable to confirm the 11 ceasefire violations.

Humanitarian bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (8 February 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out nine humanitarian operations: six in Aleppo city; one in Tallkalakh in Homs governorate; one in Junaynah in Suwayda' governorate; and one in Zabdin in Damascus governorate.

In Aleppo city, 3,800 tons of bread were delivered to civilians (in the Shaykh Maqsud and Nayrab districts, and to schools in the Jazmati, Salihin, A'zamiyah and Khalidiyah districts).

One thousand three hundred tons of food parcels were distributed to the residents of Tallkalakh in Homs governorate, Junaynah in Suwayda' governorate and Zabdin in Damascus governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, humanitarian assistance has been provided to 4,100 residents. In total, 9 tons of humanitarian cargoes have been distributed to the population.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by other States and international organizations

Russian airplanes parachuted 20.6 tons of humanitarian cargoes (food products) to the city of Dayr al-Zawr, which was received by the Syrian authorities through the United Nations.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (9 February 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, six ceasefire agreements have been signed with Shaffuniyah, Harasta al-Qantarah and Buzaynah in Damascus governorate, and with Uwaynah, Asharinah and Birah in Hama governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,212.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 has increased to 110.

Over the past 24 hours, 41.6 square kilometres have fallen under the control of government forces. A total area of 1,336.7 square kilometres has been liberated since 1 January 2017.

The number of populated areas which Syrian government forces have liberated from armed groups of the international terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 1 January 2017 has increased to 40.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported seven violations in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: two in Aleppo, two in Idlib and one in Homs.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office was unable to confirm the five ceasefire violations.

Humanitarian bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (9 February 2017)

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out eight humanitarian operations: six in Aleppo city; one in Mulayhah in Damascus governorate; and one in Aramu in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

In Aleppo city, 3.74 tons of bread were delivered to civilians (in the Shayh Tahah, Qadi Askar and Shaykh Maqsud districts, at a mosque in the Hamdaniyah-4 district and in the square at the Dar al-Shifa' Hospital in the Shi'ar district).

Four hundred food parcels were distributed to the residents of Mulayhah in Damascus governorate.

Pupils at the Hasan Askandara School in Aramu, Ladhiqiyah governorate were given 100 children's backpacks with gifts and school supplies.

Over the past 24 hours, humanitarian assistance has been provided to 3,900 residents. In total, 5.44 tons of humanitarian cargoes have been distributed to the population.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic by other States and international organizations

Russian airplanes parachuted 20.6 tons of humanitarian cargoes (food products) to the city of Dayr al-Zawr, which was received by the Syrian authorities through the United Nations.

Information bulletin of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic (10 February 2017)

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours 10 ceasefire agreements have been signed with Mayir and Mu'arrasat al-Khan in Aleppo governorate, with Mudayra, Misraba and Jarba in Damascus governorate, and with Ram al-Anz in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,222.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire of 27 February 2016 is unchanged — it is still 110.

Over the past 24 hours, 20.5 square kilometres have fallen under the control of government forces. A total area of 1,357.2 square kilometres has been liberated since 1 January 2017.

The number of populated areas which Syrian government forces have liberated from armed groups of the international terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 1 January 2017 has increased to 41.

Observance of the ceasefire regime

From 0000 hours on 30 December 2016, a ceasefire came into force in accordance with the consolidated agreement on a comprehensive resolution of the Syrian crisis.

The number of Syrian opposition armed groups that have joined the ceasefire regime is unchanged — it is still 64.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the consolidated agreement has reported 10 violations: 8 in Ladhiqiyah governorate and 2 in Hama governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported eight violations of the consolidated agreement in the following governorates: three in Damascus, three in Aleppo and two in Idlib.

During its investigations of these incidents, the Russian representative office was unable to confirm the eight ceasefire violations.

Annex to the letter dated 12 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February 2017

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted a ballistic missile launch on 12 February. It is the first ballistic missile launch by DPRK this year, which came after its launches of 24 ballistic missiles in 2016, constituting a flagrant and clear violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and a grave threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and to the international community as a whole. The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) condemns the provocation of DPRK in the strongest terms.

2. The repeated provocations by DPRK pose a direct challenge to the united resolve of the international community manifested in the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 2321 (2016). They also clearly demonstrate the unreasonable nature of the Kim Jong Un regime that is fanatically obsessed with the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, just as shown in the New Year address, in which it had threatened to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.

3. The routinized provocations of DPRK will serve to further strengthen the international community's resolve for the denuclearization of DPRK. By faithfully implementing sanctions against DPRK, including Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), along with friendly countries' strong unilateral sanctions, the Government of ROK will make DPRK realize that it will never survive unless it abandons all nuclear and missile programmes.

4. Furthermore, the Government of ROK will unwaveringly protect the lives of its people and the security of the nation against any threat from DPRK, while deterring the nuclear and missile threats of DPRK, based on the strong ROK-US combined defense posture, including by increasing the executive nature of extended deterrence.

United Nations S/2017/129

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 February 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 13 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write with reference to your letter dated 5 January 2017 and the letter annexed thereto, dated 5 January 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council and circulated as an official document of the Council (S/2017/7). I should like to reaffirm the assertions made in all the previous correspondence on the matter from the Arab Republic of Egypt addressed to the President of the Council and circulated as official documents of the Council, most recently in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations in New York addressed to the President of the Council (S/2016/408).

I should also like to reiterate the Egyptian Government's commitment to strengthening the fraternal and historical ties between the peoples and Governments of Egypt and the Sudan, and to continuing to cooperate fully in promoting the interests of the two kindred peoples.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amr Abdellatif **Aboulatta**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-02302 (E) 160217 160217

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United Nations S/2017/130

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 February 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 13 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on the activities of the Working Group for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and the report circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Report on the activities of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016

I. Introduction

1. The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations was established pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council adopted on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3).

2. The Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Fodé Seck, was appointed Chair of the Working Group for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016 (see S/2017/2/Rev.1).

3. The present report highlights the structure and substance of the meetings of the Working Group in 2016. In accordance with its mandate, the Working Group considered a number of peacekeeping issues relevant to the responsibilities of the Security Council as well as aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, without prejudice to the competence of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The programme of meetings was intended to focus the Working Group on particularly important issues, most of which were raised in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446).

II. Meetings of the Working Group

4. The Working Group continued to promote triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, seeking, in particular, to improve coordination within the peacekeeping architecture and to address important thematic issues relating to peacekeeping. It held one organizational meeting and five thematic meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries and heard briefings by senior officials from the Secretariat and regional organizations, as well as from permanent representatives and observers to the United Nations (see annex).

5. The Working Group discussed the following themes:

(a) Use of technology in peacekeeping operations;

(b) Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in peacekeeping operations;

(c) Potential for complementarity between United Nations counter-terrorism entities and peacekeeping operations;

(d) Policy framework for intelligence in peacekeeping operations;

(e) Protection of civilians: strengthening ties with political strategies.

A. Use of technology in peacekeeping operations

6. On 28 April, the Working Group met to discuss the use of technology and innovation in peacekeeping operations. In advance of the meeting, the Chair circulated a concept note (S/2016/1019).

7. In his opening remarks, the Chair underlined the importance of innovation and technology in the current context in which peacekeeping operations were increasingly taking place in complex, hostile and volatile asymmetric environments.

8. He also indicated that the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions was hampered by multifaceted and complex challenges that made the implementation of mandates, and in particular the protection of civilians, ever more difficult, especially as a result of new developments such as armed and/or terrorist groups with near-military capabilities. Accordingly, he emphasized the need to discuss those issues and welcomed the opportunity to take part in the current panel discussion.

9. The first panellist, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, emphasized the need to boost security for troops facing multifaceted threats resulting from the various changes affecting peacekeeping operations. He also stated that resorting to innovation and technology in peacekeeping was not a luxury but a necessity, given that it made it possible to work more effectively, have more knowledge of the situation on the ground and improve the living conditions of peacekeepers. He said that many of the tools available to peacekeeping missions were obsolete and that the United Nations needed to embark on a cultural revolution in the form of innovation and technology.

10. He underlined the impact of technology on working and living conditions in the field and highlighted how peacekeeping operations could leverage innovation and technology in other areas, such as tactical challenges, reconnaissance, accommodation and military transport, to improve the speed of deployments and tactical interventions, the recording of human rights violations, conflict mapping and public information dissemination, including for countering extremist ideologies.

11. He noted that novel products were being invented every day, for example, a type of microphone that, once in place, could determine whence a shot had been fired. That and many other concepts would undeniably be useful in peacekeeping operations.

12. He invited the United Nations to introduce a culture change by adopting appropriate and widely available technologies used in other contexts. Referring to the misgivings expressed in 2014 when drones had first been used by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), he explained that the takeover of Goma by the Mouvement du 23 mars had provided ample evidence of the Organization's lack of peacekeeping tools. Following the takeover, the launch of the first drone flight had, he said, radically changed the perception of the situation on the ground.

13. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the need to develop a policy framework to define the rules governing the use of technology in peacekeeping, advocating

strengthened data protection and the introduction of a modus operandi with the host country.

14. The second panellist, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, reviewed the strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support on the use of technology, which sought to implement the recommendations of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping. In addition to the introduction of novel technologies, the strategy included expanding the partnership for technology in peacekeeping operations.

15. He mentioned the example of lighter-than-air aircraft as a justification for using modern technologies and recalled that other innovations, such as the medium earth orbit satellites of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), were already being used. He emphasized the importance of training personnel to use those tools efficiently.

16. As to situational awareness, he indicated that a geospatial tracking system could be used to access all data on missions in the field, provide an overview of the situation, improve planning and ensure effective decision-making.

17. As to the environment, he emphasized the need to reduce carbon footprints. Highlighting the fact that only 33 of 10,000 vehicles available to all peacekeeping missions were so-called "light-duty vehicles", he suggested that measures should be taken to reduce the environmental footprint of the missions, for example through the use of solar-powered vehicles.

18. During the discussion, participants acknowledged the importance of using new technologies to provide better protection to peacekeeping personnel and enable them to carry out their mandate more efficiently. In that regard, a number of participants highlighted that the use of technology was a subject of prolonged negotiations in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and emphasized the role of the Special Committee, which was mandated to discuss all policy-related issues in peacekeeping.

19. There were, however, concerns about the effectiveness of drones in many missions, the quality of the services provided by private sector contractors and the assurance that countries that hosted missions would give blanket approval for the use of such technologies. Data protection, confidentiality and the security of gathered data also gave cause for concern.

20. To overcome resistance to and promote the introduction of new technologies, and to build trust regarding their use, it was suggested that regulatory frameworks could be drafted and put in place in close coordination with Member States, especially in the fields of data gathering and processing.

21. Also mentioned was the importance of identifying best practices in the area of interaction with host countries, finding the best ways to engage with them and determining how to ensure confidentiality.

22. A number of Working Group members underlined the need to ensure that gathered data were used only to protect peacekeepers and never against other Member States.

23. Some members emphasized the importance of training peacekeeping personnel to make the best use of technological tools.

24. In the area of environmental conservation, it was suggested that specific incentives could be put in place to encourage troop- and police-contributing countries and host countries to show greater concern for environmental issues.

25. The members of the Working Group agreed on the need to give further consideration to the use of new technologies in peacekeeping operations. It was proposed that the possibility of devoting a special section to technology in the work of the Special Committee could be examined.

B. Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in peacekeeping operations

26. On 27 May, the Working Group organized a thematic discussion on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, addressing capacity-building for regional actors in peacekeeping operations. In advance of the meeting, the Chair circulated a concept note (S/2016/1016).

27. The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Ioannis Vrailas, were the main speakers.

28. In his opening remarks, the Chair recalled the context of the meeting, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the joint consultations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

29. He also indicated that the discussion was part of the continuing consideration of the implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. One of the most important recommendations was for strengthened cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, and in particular the African Union, given its special status as a strategic partner of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping and security.

30. He expressed regret that the African Union was facing major challenges in fulfilling its potential in the area of peacekeeping and security on the continent, at a time when it was assuming greater responsibility in that area. Most of all, he emphasized the urgent need for flexible, sustainable and predictable funding for African Union peacekeeping operations, which explained the decision to place that issue at the centre of the discussion.

31. Endorsing those comments, the High Representative for the Peace Fund stressed that the United Nations strategic partnership came at a key juncture for the African Union because of the following factors:

(a) The changing nature of the threats to international peace and security, leading to increased demand for stronger and more proactive peacekeeping operations;

(b) The demand for African Union intervention in crises and conflicts, which could only grow in the future;

(c) A renewed interest in preventing conflicts and finding political solutions through conflict mediation;

(d) The complex interests at stake in modern peacekeeping operations, to which no single organization could respond adequately on its own.

32. In the light of those factors, he called for a strengthening of the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, especially in the search for predictable funding modalities for African Union peacekeeping operations. He specified that his mandate was focused on seeking a sustainable basis for the funding of African Union peacekeeping operations and on redefining new cooperation modalities between the African Union and the United Nations in that area, centred on the following three main objectives:

(a) To restructure the African Union Peace Fund by improving its governance, accountability, operational procedures and strategic orientation;

(b) To develop a credible road map for fulfilling the commitment of the African Union to contributing 25 per cent of the cost of its efforts on peace and security;

(c) To work with the United Nations and the international community to obtain the remaining 75 per cent from United Nations contributions.

33. The Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union recalled that the European Union had long supported the efforts of the African Union and regional African mechanisms to maintain peace and security on the continent. He reiterated its commitment to continuing its activities alongside African leaders and other partners with the aim of finding solutions to the issue of the sustainable and predictable funding of African Union peacekeeping operations.

34. Going beyond the importance of providing financial resources, he emphasized how essential it was to have an agreed cooperation, management and oversight framework to advance the partnership between the European Union and the African Union and boost its impact in the field.

35. He reiterated the determination of the European Union to support African efforts to provide its own security, recalling the establishment by the European Union of the African Peace Facility, which had raised more than €2 billion over the past decade. He explained that the activities funded within that framework covered the following areas:

(a) Support for African Union peacekeeping operations;

(b) Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture;

(c) Initiatives within the framework of the rapid response mechanism.

36. He also recalled that the European Union had decided, in July 2015, to redirect support for the Peace Fund towards tackling the challenge of sustainability and had increased its contribution to the Fund from €750 million to €900 million. The increase had made it possible to continue support for the African Union Military Observer Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) while contributing to new African Union

peacekeeping operations such as the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram and the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Guinea-Bissau. An additional grant of €710 million for the Fund had been approved for the period from 2016 to 2018.

37. The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations underlined the essential nature of the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations, on the basis of their comparative advantages.

38. He said that that paradigm shift, based on the contribution that each organization could make to politics, security, human rights, development or humanitarian issues, demonstrated a clear new awareness that no single organization could effectively respond to current challenges in the areas of peacekeeping and security, which were increasingly complex and multifaceted.

39. The new paradigm of "peacekeeping in partnership" also meant that there was a need to broaden the understanding of partnerships beyond bilateral relationships between the United Nations and individual regional organizations, or between regional organizations.

40. The issue of funding, he said, was inseparable from the strategic nature of the partnership for peacekeeping operations. Accordingly, he called for more predictable funding and sustainable support for African Union peacekeeping operations when authorized by the Security Council.

41. During the discussions, several members of the Working Group welcomed the commitment of the African Union to covering 25 per cent of the costs of its peace and security efforts by 2020. Several members also stressed the importance of considering the issue of the establishment of a sustainable and predictable funding mechanism for African Union-led peace support operations.

42. The members of the Working Group recalled the importance of developing a two-way relationship for an effective partnership, involving regular consultations.

43. They emphasized the need to identify practical means for improving relations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

44. The need for improvements to the operational capacities of the African Union, to enable it to respond to equipment needs while complying with United Nations standards, was also a concern raised by the members of the Working Group.

45. The members of the Working Group pointed out the importance of a holistic approach to the issue which, beyond peacekeeping, made it possible to reflect on the manner in which conflict prevention and the guarantee of peace could be made more specific.

C. Potential for complementarity between United Nations counter-terrorism entities and peacekeeping operations

46. On 24 June, the Working Group organized a discussion on whether there was room for complementarity between United Nations counter-terrorism entities and

peacekeeping operations. In advance of the meeting, the Chair circulated a concept note (S/2016/1018).

47. The Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate each gave a briefing.

48. In his opening remarks, the Chair recalled the context of the meeting, which was held at a time when there was a worrying increase in threats to international peace and security.

49. Referring to the examples of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and AMISOM, he emphasized the urgent need to adapt the presence and activities of missions to their environments, as well as the need to develop innovative cooperation between relevant United Nations bodies, in order to provide a coordinated and effective response.

50. The Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate said that terrorist threats were growing in areas in which peacekeeping operations were active. There were therefore obvious reasons to boost cooperation, coordination and synergies between United Nations counter-terrorism bodies and peacekeeping operations.

51. He said that relevant counter-terrorism bodies should support peacekeeping operations by sharing their expertise and experience in preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism. He stressed that their contributions would be made more effective if they were closely associated with mission planning.

52. He recalled that Security Council resolutions 2129 (2013), 2185 (2014), 2195 (2014) and 2242 (2015) and the presidential statement of 19 November 2014 (S/PRST/2014/23) provided a solid basis for boosting cooperation within and between institutions. Those documents, he noted, called upon, inter alia, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, the special envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Development Programme, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and other relevant United Nations entities to strengthen their cooperation and synergies, including by means geared towards developing dialogue and the exchange of information, in particular during the mission planning and consideration stages.

53. He advocated the implementation of the "Delivering as one" approach and suggested that the following approaches could deliver greater synergies:

(a) Considering possible channels for sharing information between counter-terrorism entities, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and troop- and police-contributing countries;

(b) Holding regular meetings involving the relevant departments to enhance cooperation and identify areas of complementarity;

(c) Boosting the contribution of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism to the work of the Working Group and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

54. The Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service recalled the conclusion outlined in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations according to which United Nations peacekeeping missions, owing to their composition and character, were not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. Among other aspects, they lacked the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required for such operations. She therefore placed strong emphasis on the importance of political solutions.

55. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that action could also be taken as part of efforts to adapt the presence and activities of peacekeeping operations in order to better prevent terrorism and violent extremism. Such action could include the following:

(a) Developing a better understanding of violent extremism and its impact;

(b) Providing peacekeeping missions with the capacity to counter asymmetric threats and tactics, especially through enhanced access to improvised explosive device detection programmes, technology and improved resilience resulting from greater mobility and medical back-up capacity;

(c) Building national capacity to prevent violent extremism by training security forces in community policing and counter-terrorism, adopting legal frameworks and national strategies for the prevention of violent extremism, building the capacity of legal actors in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offences, preventing radicalization in prisons through static and dynamic security, risk assessments and information gathering in prisons, supporting national programmes against improvised explosive devices, managing border controls and integrating counter-terrorism into security sector reform programmes.

56. The members of the Working Group recalled the conclusion of the High-level Panel regarding the unsuitability of peacekeeping operations to carry out counter-terrorism action, while also acknowledging that United Nations missions, which were exposed to asymmetric threats, needed sufficient assets and training to protect themselves.

57. They stressed the need to develop cooperation within and between institutions so that peacekeeping operations could benefit from the expertise and support of relevant United Nations bodies.

D. Policy framework for intelligence in peacekeeping operations

58. On 27 July, the Working Group organized a thematic discussion on the draft policy framework for intelligence in peacekeeping operations being developed by the Secretariat. In advance of the meeting, the Chair circulated a concept note (S/2016/1033).

59. The Working Group heard briefings by the Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, Omar Hilale.

60. The Chair, who had chosen the subject of the meeting, recalled that the Secretariat had, on several occasions in recent months, consulted Member States about its initial work to develop a draft policy framework for intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

61. Member States had, at that time, identified important issues that needed to be resolved to ensure that the framework being defined was appropriate and aligned with the mandates and context of United Nations peacekeeping and that it could be successfully implemented. Those issues included the following:

(a) Identification of information-gathering techniques, tactics and procedures appropriate to a United Nations peacekeeping context;

(b) Confidentiality, secure storage and management of information gathered during a mission cycle;

(c) Definition of parameters for using and sharing information gathered by a mission, within the United Nations and with the host countries;

(d) Operational security of the troop- and police-contributing countries that contributed to the capacity of mission information-sharing structures;

(e) Oversight mechanisms.

62. The Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service recalled the importance of having open exchanges on all sensitive matters that remained to be considered in the development of the policy framework for intelligence in peacekeeping operations. She also recalled that the mandates of peacekeeping operations and the threats that they currently faced had led the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States to place greater importance on intelligence as a key tool enabling missions to operate safely and effectively.

63. With reference to the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations in difficult environments, for example in Mali and South Sudan, she said that missions sought to adapt on a case-by-case basis in order to respond to each specific context, but that an intelligence policy would enable them to better analyse the scenarios, environment and nature of threats.

64. She maintained that the broad consensus that had emerged from prior consultations was that missions needed to be able to gather information swiftly and reliably in order to understand and respond effectively to threats as they fulfilled their mandates.

65. She pointed out that the policy framework must be governed by clear principles, parameters and oversight regimes that ensured a transparent, responsible and professional approach.

66. Similarly, the mission intelligence cycle should focus on the safety and security of the mission and its personnel so that peacekeeping operations could have genuine freedom of movement, carry out their activities and fulfil their mandates.

67. Regarding information gathering and analysis, she said that the Secretariat proposed that the strategic framework should explicitly state that peacekeeping operations should not gather information by covert technical or human means.

68. She considered that those parameters should be reflected in specific mission activity support plans to identify appropriate techniques, tactics and procedures and implement the oversight regime defined in the policy framework.

69. Regarding relationships with host countries, she indicated that it was important, when developing the intelligence policy framework, to note that the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, including consent, should be fully respected. The mission mandate and the status-of-forces agreement would remain the key legal foundations for the presence and activities of the mission.

70. Furthermore, she said, if the framework explicitly ruled out covert activities, it would mean that missions would not use any tools without informing the host Government. Missions would certainly share intelligence with host Governments, and vice versa, where necessary.

71. With regard to the concerns of neighbouring Member States, she recalled that, since the first deployment of drones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and later in Mali and the Central African Republic, the Secretariat had implemented several lessons learned by defining controlled access areas with different authorization levels and sensors that could be programmed to have shutter control, in order to limit their focus to authorized areas only. Arrangements for those measures could be reflected in the strategic framework as an integral part of the mission intelligence support plan or the standing operational procedure.

72. She noted that two recurrent criticisms in the area of information security and confidentiality were:

(a) How to ensure the operational security of the mission, restrict dissemination within the mission and protect sources;

(b) How to respond to the national operational security requirements of troop-contributing countries participating in mission information systems.

73. She stressed that, in general, the framework should define a clear responsibility and oversight regime within the intelligence cycle and at all stages of the work, including through the use of verification files. The matter would have to be considered more thoroughly to ensure that the required mechanisms were in place at the appropriate levels.

74. She recalled that the experience of drone deployment, first by MONUSCO and later by other missions, had stimulated detailed planning and the development of practices on issues such as access rights, electronic surveillance tools and the physical architecture of buildings.

75. She went on to say that, from a legal standpoint, all information gathered by peacekeeping operations units was the property of the mission, but that, as more advanced intelligence tools were introduced, that principle would have to be reconciled with the national legal framework of troop-contributing countries governing what could be shared.

76. She considered that defining the principles and limits of the use of the information would provide greater clarity. For example, the letters of assist for units provided by troop-contributing countries could be amended to include detailed modalities on the use of information.

77. In her opinion, consideration should be given to, among other things, rationalizing the role of civilian components, putting in place mechanisms to ensure that missions took a holistic approach and strengthening the skills and processes of all components in order for them to interact with the local population and learn lessons, while ensuring that missions had all the skills required to carry out a thorough and balanced analysis.

78. She stressed that peacekeeping operations involved unique challenges for an intelligence system and that the response to those challenges needed intelligence concepts, structures and tools adapted to the context and realities of missions. That would require all parties to be creative and flexible in considering new approaches that were not necessarily based on preconceived models.

79. The Permanent Representative of Morocco said that the meaning of "intelligence" should be clarified because it had given rise to concerns that had yet to be dispelled. He suggested that the discussions of intelligence issues were preliminary. Several major issues, such as the management of sensitive information, confidentiality, costs and the ownership of the information gathered, needed much more thorough consideration. Most of all, he emphasized confidentiality management and indicated that the policy framework should clearly define the scope and use of the information gathered.

80. He also said that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was the most suitable setting for developing the intelligence policy framework. In doing so, the imperative of mission security should be reconciled with respect for the sovereignty of States.

81. Some Member States had previously raised concerns regarding the use of information gathering in United Nations peacekeeping, and had highlighted that all United Nations entities and Member States had an obligation to cooperate with Security Council sanctions committees; therefore, any information gathered could not be guaranteed to be limited to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Other Member States had also highlighted that the effect of information gathering on neighbouring countries went beyond drones and unmanned aerial vehicles and that close coordination with neighbouring countries was crucial in that regard. Working Group members reiterated that more consultations with Member States were necessary and that any policy framework must be discussed in the Special Committee.

82. The members of the Working Group stressed the importance of information gathering for the security and effectiveness of missions as they fulfilled their mandates, especially in asymmetric environments. Nevertheless, they also considered that it would be crucial to pursue their discussions in order to shed more light on issues that required more thorough consideration.

E. Protection of civilians: strengthening ties with political strategies

83. On 3 November, the Working Group organized a thematic discussion on the protection of civilians, addressing the strengthening of ties with political strategies. In advance of the meeting, the Chair circulated a concept note (S/2016/1017).

84. The Director of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the military adviser at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, Brigadier General Thierry Lion, were the main speakers.

85. In his opening remarks, the Chair said that the issue of the protection of civilians needed to be resolved, given the changing threats currently faced by United Nations missions. He recalled that, in many theatres of peacekeeping operations, the presence of criminal groups acting on the margins of international law was a serious threat to the proper fulfilment of mandates to protect civilians.

86. He also stressed the shortcomings and challenges that needed to be addressed, especially in contexts in which missions were deployed in hostile environments or those where there was little or no peace to keep.

87. In that connection, he indicated that the promotion of political and non-armed strategies, capacity-building and the strengthening of operational concepts in peacekeeping operations should be given greater attention in the search for sustainable solutions to the problems encountered in the protection of civilians.

88. In his statement, the Director of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division reviewed recent developments in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, highlighting the challenges faced by peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians. He also indicated that the protection of civilians was not confined to operational and tactical aspects and should include the key aspect of a political strategy.

89. He added that, in the absence of a viable political strategy to end fighting and support a peaceful settlement, no number of troops would ever be enough to protect civilians and that, without a political settlement leading to a legitimate authority with the will and ability to ensure the security of its people, the protection of civilians could not be guaranteed.

90. Pointing out that political strategies and the protection of civilians were therefore closely related, he also recalled that peacekeepers could help to establish, support and protect a political process and help national actors to fulfil their sovereign obligation to protect civilians, but could not replace those actors. For that reason, the primary responsibility for protection lay with the host States.

91. In his opinion, a political settlement could not be pursued unless the security and needs of the people involved in a conflict were taken into account. Furthermore, unless the United Nations met the urgent need for protection amid an armed conflict, the search for peace was likely to be even more difficult.

92. He also made four observations that highlighted the implications and connections between the protection of civilians and the pursuit of a political settlement.

93. The first observation was that, in contexts such as that of South Sudan, where there was no viable political process and civilians were "targeted directly", the need for protection was urgent and enormous. When missions took on that task in the absence of a parallel and interdependent political effort, however, they would probably find themselves dealing with the consequences of conflict, not its causes. The missions would be likely to lose the political initiative as a result.

94. He considered that it was at that point that the role of the Security Council, Member States and the main stakeholders, including regional organizations, became essential and that a coordinated political effort required the actions of the main local, national and international actors to be consistent. If political efforts failed, it was time to reflect upon what missions could reasonably be expected to achieve.

95. His second observation was that the commitment to taking protection into account in the context of political efforts required consideration of the role of host States, which were often parties to the conflict. Whereas peacekeeping forces were deployed with their consent, the reality was that government forces sometimes threatened civilians. That could put peacekeeping forces and the host authorities on a collision course. Tensions over protection mandates could sometimes compromise other mission activities. The decision to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation ultimately reflected an agreement between the Security Council and a country. The peacekeeping operation could not be a substitute for that relationship.

96. Missions were required to do whatever they could to establish and maintain an effective relationship with host States and peoples. Responsible behaviour by all peacekeepers was therefore essential.

97. His third observation was that considering protection to be a key component of a political strategy meant being realistic about the risks involved. When peacekeepers were deployed in conflicts where civilians were being "deliberately targeted", they accepted a certain level of risk. The question then became the acceptable level of risk and the risk abatement strategies that could be put in place to manage that risk. Troops and police, in his opinion, were entitled to have detailed information on measures being implemented, to ensure that they could operate safely in those environments, and to hold the Secretariat responsible for providing basic support and a political commitment to support security operations. Troop-contributing countries also had a key role in helping to improve security and risk management, and they must be ready to do so.

98. The fourth observation was that the interdependence between policy and protection meant that protection consisted of a set of mission responsibilities and efforts, as well as full responsibility on the part of the Secretariat. Protection was too often considered to be the job of the military and police components of a mission. Experience showed that protection must be mainstreamed into all mission work: political good offices, planning processes, programming and messaging activities. The understanding and capacity of senior managers should be improved, and efforts should be made to mainstream protection strategies into mission concepts and plans. Nevertheless, there was also a need for support, in particular from the Security Council, to ensure that analyses, plans, activities and reports were systematic and consistent in the area of protection.

99. The military adviser at the Permanent Mission of France, who shared his experience as a force commander in the Central African Republic, indicated that an overall political response was the basis for any effective protection. A strictly humanitarian view of the security approach should be abandoned.

100. Suggesting that the various mission strategies were interconnected, he said that every advance in the area of security should be accompanied by the launch of a political process. He also emphasized engagement with the people, whose trust was key to establishing a successful protection strategy. He therefore recommended that troops should communicate better with the people and with local and religious structures during their missions. He advocated the coordination and planning of mission activities as part of a holistic approach consistent with a political strategy.

101. The members of the Working Group stressed the importance of taking greater account of political strategies in the protection of civilians and of promoting strategic convergence in missions by avoiding fragmentation.

102. They also reiterated the primary responsibility of the host country in the protection of civilians and the support role of peacekeeping operations.

103. Furthermore, they reiterated the role of troop-contributing countries, especially in training and preparing contingents to implement the mandate effectively. In that regard, some Working Group members expressed the view that rapid deployment and the protection of civilians often required enabling units and that countries with such units should be encouraged to provide them to peacekeeping missions, while others argued that the question needed further discussion in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

III. Conclusions and recommendations

104. Large-scale participation by troop- and police-contributing countries and an effective contribution by the Secretariat to the work of the Working Group during 2016 were signs of strong interest in the activities of the Working Group.

105. That positive trend should therefore be harnessed in order to further strengthen the strategic dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries.

106. The important issues considered by the Working Group require more substantial dialogue in order to improve the impact on the ground.

107. Where relevant, information sessions with troop-contributing countries and consultations at the time of mandate renewal could contribute to comprehensive discussions on all aspects of mandates. To promote frank and continuing dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries, discussions should be based on thorough and objective analyses of the situation on the ground and of the capacity required to respond adequately.

108. The experience in South Sudan shows that far more intense dialogue is needed on issues relating to the implementation of mandates, including the need to protect civilians.

109. In the spirit of the presidential statement of 31 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/26), troop- and police-contributing countries, the Secretariat and the Security Council should work harder to enhance triangular consultations.

110. Lastly, as with those of other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, Working Group documents should be made available on https://eroom.un.org/eRoom.

Annex

Meetings of the Working Group in 2016

Date	*Briefers*	*Theme*
28 April	Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Atul Khare, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support	Use of technologies in peacekeeping
27 May	El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Donald Kaberuka, African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund Ioannis Vrailas, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in peacekeeping operations
24 June	Renata Dwan, Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Weixiong Chen, Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	Potential for complementarity between United Nations counter-terrorism entities and peacekeeping operations
27 July	Renata Dwan, Head of the Policy and Best Practices Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Omar Hilale, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations	Policy framework for intelligence in peacekeeping operations
3 November	Jack Christofides, Director of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Brigadier General Thierry Lion, military adviser at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations	Protection of civilians: strengthening ties with political strategies

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Letter dated 13 February 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey herewith the fifth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Letter dated 13 February 2017 from the Head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has the honour to transmit its fifth report pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2235 (2015) and 2319 (2016).

(*Signed*) Virginia **Gamba**
Head
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-
United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

Fifth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the fifth report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2319 (2016). It covers the period from 20 October 2016, when the Mechanism's fourth report (S/2016/888) was submitted to the Council, to 10 February 2017.

II. Background

2. The Mechanism was established by the Security Council in its resolution 2235 (2015) with a mandate to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW fact-finding mission determined or had determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic had involved or had likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons.

3. During 2016, the Mechanism implemented its mandate in two phases. The first, pertaining to information collection and planning for case development, consisted of reviewing and analysing the mission's data, mapping the incidents and developing investigation plans and methodology. At the end of the first phase, the Mechanism had identified nine cases in the Syrian Arab Republic to be investigated (see S/2016/738/Rev.1). The second phase (case investigation) consisted of in-depth analysis of the cases identified and continued until sufficient information had been gathered, analysed, assessed and corroborated to allow the Mechanism to present its findings to the Security Council.

4. In the Mechanism's third and fourth reports, the Leadership Panel reported that it had reached a conclusion as to the actors involved in the following four cases: Talmenes (21 April 2014), Sarmin (16 March 2015), Qmenas (16 March 2015) and Marea (21 August 2015). In relation to the first three incidents, the Panel had determined that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces had been involved in the use of toxic chemicals as weapons and that their helicopters had been used to drop barrel bombs in those three cases. It had also identified the Hama and Humaymim airbases, both controlled by the Government, as the airbases from which the helicopter flights had originated. In relation to the incident in Marea, the Panel had determined that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had conducted an attack in Marea, using several artillery shells filled with sulfur mustard, a chemical weapon.

5. In paragraph 1 of resolution 2319 (2016), by which the Mechanism's mandate was renewed, the Security Council reaffirmed the mandate contained in resolution 2235 (2015). It was also reaffirmed that the Mechanism would continue to base its work on the letters dated 27 August and 9 September 2015 from the Secretary-

General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/669 and S/2015/696). The structure, terms of reference and procedures, including with regard to the Mechanism's methods of work, information management, modalities for access, evidence and reporting, therefore remain unchanged.

6. Furthermore, in paragraphs 4 and 9 of resolution 2319 (2016), the Mechanism was encouraged to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. This was in order to exchange information on non-State actor perpetration, organization, sponsorship or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons for those incidents falling within the Mechanism's mandate and, as appropriate, to brief those bodies on relevant results of the Mechanism's work.

7. The Mechanism was also invited, in paragraph 5 of resolution 2319 (2016), to engage with relevant regional States in pursuit of its mandate, including in order to identify to the greatest extent feasible any individuals, entities or groups associated with ISIL or the Nusrah Front (now calling itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham), on the incidents falling within the Mechanism's mandate. Furthermore, regional States were encouraged to provide to the Mechanism, as appropriate, information on non-State actors' access to chemical weapons and their components or efforts by non-State actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use chemical weapons and their means of delivery that occurred under their jurisdiction.

8. In addition, the Mechanism was invited, in paragraph 6 of resolution 2319 (2016), to offer its assistance to OPCW in situations where a State party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction requested assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons.

III. Activities

9. In its fourth report, the Mechanism reported that it had closed its investigations office in The Hague, Netherlands, and its liaison office in Damascus on 23 September 2016 because the technical roll-over authorized by the Security Council through the exchange of letters (S/2016/806 and S/2016/807) was solely for the completion and submission of its fourth report. After the submission of that report, a second technical roll-over was authorized to allow for consultations on the possible renewal of the mandate.

10. During the period of this second technical roll-over, the New York office remained minimally staffed. After the adoption of resolution 2319 (2016), efforts were focused on budgetary issues and on refitting the investigative office in The Hague, including providing equipment necessary for secure information management and staffing.

11. In this regard, the Mechanism had previously reported that alternative information collection efforts and investigative skills would be required to

investigate the various layers of perpetration, in addition to the sponsors, organizers and those otherwise involved. To this end, efforts have been and will continue to be made to strengthen the investigative office in The Hague through the establishment of two dedicated investigative units that are complementary: the information collection unit and the analysis and corroboration unit. The capacity of the investigative office has been reinforced by hiring personnel with extensive experience in complex investigations and with specialized knowledge, such as forensics, counter-terrorism and military analysts. Special consideration was given to retaining the institutional knowledge of the office.

12. Assistance similar to the previous technical support obtained, such as for translation, may also be needed. The Mechanism continues to have a trust fund, which will be used for all material and technical needs in the implementation of its mandate. Existing donors have been requested to extend the time frame of their contributions to reflect the timeline of resolution 2319 (2016), and a fundraising effort has begun. An additional financial contribution was received from one Member State.

Interaction with Member States and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

13. The New York office continued to interact with Member States on its mandate, including through the provision of status updates. Furthermore, the Mechanism received nine allegations from Member States on non-State actors' transfer or possession of, or use or intent to use, chemical weapons or toxic chemicals. One allegation concerned the use of chlorine in Aleppo in December 2016 by an armed opposition group. Eight allegations concerned the possession of and intent to use chemical weapons, including missiles fitted with chemical warheads. One was related to the transfer of chemicals to armed opposition groups with the intent to use them as chemical weapons. Three of these allegations specifically referred to ISIL receiving and possessing toxic chemicals with an intention to use them as a weapon. These allegations were shared with the OPCW technical secretariat.

14. In view of the above, the New York office continued to maintain regular contact with the OPCW technical secretariat.

15. Furthermore, as stated in the fourth report of the Mechanism, on 10 October 2016, a communication was received from the Syrian Arab Republic that contained a reference to an internal investigation being carried out by the Syrian national committee. According to the communication, the committee had conducted a thorough study (technical and legal) and had reviewed the flight plans and air operations in some areas under investigation by the Mechanism, specifically referring to the Hama and Humaymim airbases. As previously reported, the Leadership Panel had formally requested the Government to provide the names of the specific Syrian Arab Armed Forces units and any entity outside the Armed Forces from whom the national committee had received the flight plans and information relating to air operations. A reply to that request had not yet been received at the time of writing. Such information is of great importance, given that commanders are responsible for any assets under their control. Investigators will also have the capacity to review and analyse any information provided.

Consultations with United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies

16. Pursuant to resolution 2319 (2016), the New York office has established contact and held preliminary discussions with the Chairs of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities for the exchange of information envisaged in paragraph 4 of the resolution.

IV. Way forward and concluding remarks

17. The starting point of the Mechanism's investigation will be those cases in which the fact-finding mission has determined that an incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons. The mission's latest report (S/2017/45) concluded that the mission could not confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical had been used as a weapon in the investigated incident. Accordingly, no further action can be taken by the Mechanism in relation to that incident. Nevertheless, there is another mission under way and the Mechanism will be ready to investigate such cases in which the mission determines the use or likely use of chemicals as weapons.

18. The Mechanism's set-up ensures that it has the capacity and skills necessary to carry out concurrent investigations on multiple sets of issues. While awaiting further determinations by the fact-finding mission, the Mechanism will be working on making the investigative office in The Hague operational and ready to conduct investigations by March 2017. In relation to those four cases in which the Leadership Panel had reached a conclusion on the actors involved, as indicated in the third and fourth reports, the investigative office will also be prepared to conduct an investigation to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, additional actors, such as perpetrators, organizers and sponsors. This capacity will also be reinforced through the exchange of information with United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies that may provide further leads with respect to non-State actors, more specifically ISIL and the Nusrah Front (Jabhat Fath al-Sham).

19. Lastly, the Mechanism expresses its appreciation to the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Department of Management and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and to the OPCW technical secretariat for the administrative and operational support received.

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Question of Cyprus

Security Council
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Letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 8 February 2017, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Güven **Begeç**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 10 February 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 25 January 2017 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/71/766-S/2017/74), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" Notices to Airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require Notices to Airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air- and seaports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly states, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international

bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)".

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,628,887, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016, 27,109 planes used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 210,789 planes used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are at a critical stage, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners in the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance for a results-oriented negotiating process within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2017/133

Security Council

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Identical letters dated 13 February 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to draw your attention to an alarming statement made by the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun. In his statement, the President expressed support for the military build-up of Hezbollah, an internationally designated terrorist organization.

In an interview held yesterday, 12 February 2017, President Aoun stated that "as long as the army is not powerful enough to face Israel, we feel the need to maintain Hezbollah's weapons. These weapons complement the action of the army".

It is evident from this statement that the Lebanese Government is not only failing to fulfil its obligations under Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004) but is actively encouraging and legitimizing Hezbollah's activity, which clearly violates these resolutions.

The Security Council, in resolution 1701 (2006), required "the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that ... there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State".

In the 10 years since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), Hezbollah has amassed over 150,000 rockets and missiles, and has positioned its arsenal in the midst of the civilian population in southern Lebanon.

The previous Secretary-General stated in his report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) that "the maintenance of arms by Hezbollah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to contradict the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006)".

Furthermore, by claiming that Hezbollah's weapons are complementary to those of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the President of Lebanon is providing a further example of the growing cooperation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces. This is a concerning trend which the international community should act to prevent.

The international community must send a clear message to the Government of Lebanon and to all its institutions regarding their obligation to implement Security Council resolutions.

17-02283 (E) 160217

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I call on the Security Council to publicly condemn this outrageous statement and to demand that the Government of Lebanon uphold its commitments and fully implement Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004).

Only the full implementation of these resolutions can ensure security and stability in the Middle East.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative